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Introduction
The origins, social function, and the legitimacy of law were life-long
preoccupations for Judith Shklar. She was one of the ﬁrst political philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition after World War II to devote
intense attention to the role of law in liberal-democratic societies. In this
respect, her work is more in line with European thinkers such as Max
Weber, Franz Neumann and Harold Laski, and, of course, her adviser,
Carl Friedrich, who was the ﬁrst to recommend to her that she consider
the topic of legalism.1 From her 1964 book on Legalism2 to her 1987 essay
on “Political Theory and the Rule of Law,”3 Shklar develops a contextualist
analysis of law that situates it within socio-historical and cultural conditions, while seeking to avoid the normative skepticism to which such
contextualism might lead. This tension between the socio-historical function of law and its normative content are the two poles around which her
reﬂections vacillate, without quite reaching an equilibrium. In her work,
“the facticity” and “the validity” of the law face each other as unreconciled
dimensions.4
In this chapter we ﬁrst consider Shklar’s early book on Legalism in which
she distinguishes among aspects of legalism as ideology, creative policy,
and an ethos of the law. Shklar’s critique of international criminal law, to
which the second half of Legalism is devoted, is being revived today by

1

2

3

4

Judith B. Walzer, “Oral History of Tenured Women in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at
Harvard University,” Hadl. 1902.1/00709 Murray Research Archive (1988).
Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: An Essay on Law, Morals, and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1964).
Judith N. Shklar, “Political Theory and the Rule of Law,” in idem, Political Thought and
Political Thinkers, ed. Stanley Hoffmann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1986]
1998), pp. 21–38.
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, [1992] 1996).
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those who share her skepticism. But this revival misrepresents the subtleties of her position and needs to be balanced against her full-throated
defense of the legitimacy of the Nuremberg Trials, which, we will argue,
merits consideration along with Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem.
Over the years, Shklar sought to differentiate more precisely between
“the rule of law,” which she continued to defend rigorously and “legalism”
as a mistaken theory and practice of it. The skepticism of her early work
was tempered by her more nuanced analysis of the rule of law in later
writings. We turn to an elaboration of this distinction in the latter half of
this essay.

1 Legalism: An Essay on Mentalité
Written in the direct and acerbic style that would become her mark, Shklar
states: “This is . . . a polemical and opinionated book. It is, however, not
meant to be destructive . . . The object here is to stir up controversy by
a clear confrontation of incompatible positions, not just to upset the
genteel academic applecart.”5 Shklar’s wish to stir up controversy was
not fulﬁlled. At the time the book was largely ignored both by legal
theorists6 and political philosophers but it did signal the emergence of
the singular voice of one younger than German-Jewish luminaries such as
Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss who had dominated American academia in
political theory during those years.
With the memory of the Nuremberg trials and the McCarthy hearings in
the United States still very much alive, Shklar positioned herself against
too much self-congratulation on the part of liberal democracies. Drawing
a sharp line between the ideologies of free market capitalism and the
political essence of liberalism, she wrote of her work that:
It is, at its simplest, a defense of social diversity, inspired by that bare bones
liberalism which, having abandoned the theory of progress and every speciﬁc

5
6

Shklar, Legalism, p. viii.
Samuel Moyn observes how few reviews had appeared in legal journals, and contrasts this
with increasing references to her work in recent years: Samuel Moyn, “Judith Shklar versus
the International Criminal Court,” Humanity, 4 (2013), p. 500, at 500 fn. 43. Early reviews of
Shklar’s book were: Francis R. Aumann, Journal of Politics, 27 (1965), 703–705;
H. A. Bedau, Philosophical Review, 76 (1967), 129–130; and Brendan F. Brown,
University of Toronto Law Journal, 17 (1967), 218–225.
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scheme of economics, is committed only to the belief that tolerance is a primary
virtue and that a diversity of opinions and habits is not only to be endured but to be
cherished and encouraged. The assumption throughout is that social diversity is the
prevailing condition of modern nation-states and that it ought to be promoted.7

What is legalism? Shklar deﬁnes it as “the ethical attitude that holds
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to
consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”8 This claim at ﬁrst
suggests that her concern is with moral philosophy of a certain kind and
Shklar, who was to write a book on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,9 could
have been thinking of Hegel’s critique of the legalism and abstract rigour of
Kant’s moral philosophy. Yet although she devotes a few pages to a critique
of Kantian morality,10 she is not concerned with moral theory as such but
rather with legalism as a way of thinking about the law that tries to insulate
the law from morals as well as politics.
The ﬁrst part of her book deals with a critique of analytical positivism –
including the views of Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart – as well as of natural
law theories. Whereas analytical positivism attempts to distinguish law
from both politics and morals by professing ideological neutrality and
formalism, natural law approaches set a premium on law and moral
agreement which, in turn, is incompatible with diversity and tolerance.11
Shklar thinks that her critique of legalism applies equally well to both
perspectives, but this is not convincing. The difﬁculty with natural law
theories is not the separation but rather the conﬂation of law and morals,
and even of law and politics.12 The real target of her critique is the legal
positivist tradition and in particular the relationship of legalism to liberalism as understood in this tradition. And along the way, she makes
a number of distinctions concerning legalism that begin to blur the crispness of her original assertions.
Legalism is said to be the “ideology” of its practitioners in that they
believe that the legal system consists of the rule of law and that law rests on
formally correct rationality in the sense speciﬁed by Max Weber.13 For her,
7
9

10
13

8
Shklar, Legalism, p. 5.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 1.
Judith N. Shklar, Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). In her interview
with Judith Walzer, Shklar states that this book was one she was least satisﬁed with.
Walzer, “Oral History of Tenured Women.”
12
Shklar, Legalism, pp. 47–49, 57. 11 Shklar, Legalism, p. 5.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 8.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 21.
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this belief is ideological because law’s coercive power as well as the fact
that it is obeyed by those it addresses are not just matters of legal sanction
and legal doctrine; rather the law must be seen to be “part of a social
continuum.”14 This critique of legal formalism and her insistence that law
ought to be considered in a social context have led some to call Shklar
a “postmodernist,”15 or, more plausibly, to classify her as a precursor of the
Critical Legal Studies movement.16 Neither classiﬁcation can do justice to
Shklar’s own account of the relation of legalism to liberalism. She herself
tried to capture this relationship in a paradoxical formula:
The great paradox revealed here is that legalism as an ideology is too inﬂexible to
recognize the enormous potential of legalism as a creative policy but exhausts itself
in intoning traditional pieties and principles which are incapable of realization.
This is, of course, the perennial character of ideologies. It should not, however, in
this case, lead one to forget the greatness of legalism as an ethos when it expresses
itself in the characteristic institutions of the law.17

Legalism then has at least three dimensions: it is an ideology; it is
a creative policy; and it is an ethos of the law. It is indeed paradoxical
that if legalism is an ideology it would also be accepted as creative policy as
well as admired as an ethos. Practitioners prefer one policy to another and
adopt one ethos rather than another precisely because they believe they
have good and justiﬁed reasons to do so. If they thought that such a policy
or ethos were merely ideological, they would be less sanguine in accepting
them. Yet by “ideology” Shklar does not mean “false consciousness” or
“distortion” in the Marxian sense but rather “a series of personal responses

14
15

16

17

Shklar, Legalism, pp. 3, 35.
Steven White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991).
Moyn, “Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court,” 474. Shklar raised these
observations about her own work in the Preface to the new edition of Legalism: Law,
Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. xi–xii. She
also commented that “Legalism, which is my favorite of the books that I have written, went
quickly from being a radical outrage to being a conventional commonplace, when compared to the ‘assaults’ of the Critical Legal Studies Movement.” Judith Shklar, “A Life of
Learning,” in Bernard Yack, ed., Liberalism without Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and
the Political Vision of Judith N. Shklar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996),
pp. 274–275. See also Robin West, “Reconsidering Legalism,” Minnesota Law Review, 88
(2003), 122: “In the forty years since Shklar’s book was published, not all, but much of it
has stood the test of time.”
Shklar, Legalism, p. 112 (emphases added).

Judith Shklar’s Critique of Legalism

to social experiences which come to color, quite insensibly often, all our
categories of thought.”18
Viewed as such, for the “historian of ideas,” as she also calls herself,19
legalism is ideological not because it is a form of false consciousness but
because it reﬂects the inevitable perspective of the practitioner of “mature
legal systems,” as articulated in, for example, the theories of J. L. Austin,
Kelsen and Hart.20 In this sense “ideology” seems to mean something like
the inevitable presuppositions without which a practice may not make
sense. To use the language of the late Wittgenstein, some rules are constitutive of what it means to play poker or to do algebra, for example, and
for the poker player as well as the one who solves algebra problems,
a certain perspective is inevitable. Yet this is not what Shklar has in mind
either since she denies that what is called the “inevitable perspective of the
mature legal system,” amounts to the constitutive rules and practices of
a system without adopting which one cannot be a player or a problem
solver; rather, she suggests that to separate law radically from morals and
politics is a choice, and not an epistemic inevitability.
In an essay called “In Defense of Legalism,” written shortly after her
book was published, Shklar introduced yet a fourth dimension of this
concept. “Legalism” refers here to a theoretical way of looking at the law
by moral philosophers, jurists, and others. It is not so much the perspective of the practitioner of law that is emphasized but that of the outsider
who is trying to understand legal systems. She asks: “What mature moral
attitudes and political ideologies are and are not compatible with
‘mature’ legal systems? What are the social limits of legalistic
mores?”21 Observing that Max Weber had already discussed this question but that legal theorists have not paid him enough attention, she
quotes Weber: “For the lawyer an order is either valid or not, but no such
alternative exists for the sociologist. Fluid transitions exist between
validity and non-validity.”22
Nonetheless, as inevitable as contextualization and a sociological attitude may be in demystifying legalist theories of law, can we wholeheartedly recommend that legalism be adopted by the legal practitioner even
18
20
21
22

19
Shklar, Legalism, p. 41.
Shklar, Legalism, p. vii.
Judith Shklar, “In Defense of Legalism,” Journal of Legal Education, 9 (1966), 51–58.
Shklar, “In Defense of Legalism,” 53.
Shklar, “In Defense of Legalism,” 53 fn. 5; see Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 4–5.
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while we know it to be a historically contingent perspective reﬂecting the
preferences of a certain social milieu alone? Shklar’s intellectual honesty
leads her to confront this question head-on. “Anyone who asserts that
justice is a policy and that the judicial process is not the antithesis of
politics, but just one form of political action among others, must expect
to meet certain outraged accusations.”23 But the answer, she says, is that
“there is politics and politics.”24 As opposed to victor’s justice and sham
political trials: “There are occasions when political trials may actually
serve liberal ends, where they promote legalistic values in such a way as
to contribute to constitutional politics and to a decent legal system. The
Trial of the Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg probably had that effect.”25 Is this answer satisfactory? Can
Shklar really put to rest accusations of victor’s justice (“Siegerjustiz”) about
the Nuremberg trials? Before turning to her account of the Nuremberg
trials, let us stress the conceptual conundrums, and even impossibilities, of
reconciling legalism as ideology, policy, and ethos. Even in the nonpejorative sense of ideology, it is hard to defend legalism as a policy and to
recommend it as an ethos once it is demystiﬁed by the contextual work of
the intellectual historian. Shklar’s principal objective of reconciling liberalism and legalism remains remote and paradoxical.
Samuel Moyn concludes that legalism “not only does work but must
work as a noble lie: philosophers, and perhaps associated guardians,
know it is false but allow its many votaries to proceed as if it were
true because only the myth makes their conduct possible.”26 Moyn
radically disagrees with Shklar’s somewhat cheery assessment of the
inﬂuence of Nuremberg on postwar Germany and legal developments.
He is skeptical that, having suffered the excessive politicization of law
under the Nazi regime, the German people were ready to switch to
a more humane and liberal politics, “by adopting a legalism they simultaneously knew was a myth but adopted purely and self-consciously as
a matter of political utility.”27 Moyn adds that “[o]ne difﬁculty with
legalist myths – whether it is fatal or not is a matter of dispute – is that
the people will get wind of the truth.”28

23
26
27
28

24
25
Shklar, Legalism, p. 143.
Shklar, Legalism. p. 145.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 145.
Moyn, “Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court,” 494 (emphasis added).
Moyn, “Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court,” 494.
Moyn, “Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court,” 495.
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We have to tread carefully here. For Shklar, legalism is not a lie, whether
noble or not. She insists that her considerations “do not imply a criticism of
legalism as an ethos or of law as an institution. It must be repeated that the
hope is that a greater degree of social self-awareness will make legalism
a more effective social force, a more intelligible and defensible political
ideology and a more useful concept in social theory.”29 She may have been
too sanguine in thinking that a “greater degree of social self-awareness”
would not lead instead to a more skeptical and dismissive attitude toward
legalism in all its dimensions, but to defend it as “a noble lie” was not her
intention. Nowhere are the tensions among these complex dimensions
more evident than in her analysis of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.

2 International Criminal Law and Legalism
Shklar was one of the ﬁrst to address the philosophical puzzles of
international criminal law in the wake of World War II. “There was
and is no system of international criminal law,” she wrote, “just as
there are no international community and international political institutions to formulate or regularly enforce criminal laws.”30 Despite this
militant dismissal of international criminal law, she reaches the surprising conclusion that: “What makes the Nuremberg Trial so remarkable is
that, in the absence of strict legal justiﬁcation, it was a great legalistic
29
30

Shklar, “In Defense of Legalism,” 58 (emphasis added).
Shklar, Legalism, p. 157. Shklar’s observations about the conceptual absurdities of the
Tokyo Trials, and her sardonic comments on the work of the chief prosecutor, Joseph
Keenan, anticipate many postcolonial critiques of international law in our times:
Shklar, Legalism, pp. 181ff. Commenting on Mr. Keenan’s claim that the “ChristianJudaic absolutes of good and evil” had universal validity, Shklar exclaims: “What on
earth could the Judeo-Christian ethic mean to the Japanese?” Ibid., p. 183. But was
Shklar objecting to the obtuseness of the American prosecutor alone or did she have
a more radical objection in mind such as the legitimacy of holding a trial for war
criminals across such vast cultural divides at all? Why could one not see the Tokyo
Trials as a form of “creative policy” much the same way as she did Nuremberg? After all,
Japan was not as removed from and as uninformed about Western conceptions of
legality as Shklar may have assumed. For a recent judicious account of the controversies concerning the legitimacy of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial in the light of new
historical evidence, see Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of
Justice in the Wake of World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). For
a postcolonial critique of international law, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism,
Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
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act, the most legalistic of all possible policies, and, as such, a powerful
inspiration to legalistic ethos.”31 While the Trial was a political one in
that it aimed to eliminate a political enemy and its ideology, “it need
have given offense neither to legalistic nor to liberal values.” And
“[o]nly because the crimes against humanity were the moral center of
the case that all this was possible.”32
It is surprising that of the three charges considered in the Trial –
crimes against the peace or waging aggressive war, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity – Shklar should focus insistently on crimes
against humanity. Her reasons were as follows: she thought that the ﬁrst
charge against the Nazis was justiﬁably subject to the argument tu
quoque, that is, the leaders of states judging the Nazis had committed
acts no less criminal against the peace than had the Nazis.33 Regarding
the charge that the Nazis had committed war crimes, Shklar’s riposte is
that, of course they had, but they had also engaged in acts that went far
beyond the Hague Convention of 1907, which the French representative
on the Tribunal wanted to consider as the binding document. Shklar, like
Hannah Arendt, is convinced that what justiﬁes the charge of crimes
against humanity is the novelty of the acts in which the Nazis had
engaged: “To say that the charge of crimes against humanity was
unknown is therefore no argument against it.”34
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt had argued that the
Jerusalem Court erred in condemning Eichmann for “crimes against the
Jewish people” in the ﬁrst instance and by naming “crimes against humanity” only as the third and separate charge.35 In the dramatic Epilogue to
Eichmann, speaking in the voice of the Judges of Jerusalem, Arendt
explained what crimes against humanity means for her.36 Genocide, the
highest of the crimes against humanity, is an attack upon the human status
and human plurality, which is the condition “under which life on earth has

31

32
35

36

Shklar, Legalism, p. 170; cf. West, “Reconsidering Legalism,” 122–124; Tiphaine Dickson,
“Shklar’s Legalism and the Liberal Paradox,” Constellations, 22 (2015), 193–194.
33
34
Shklar, Legalism, p. 170.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 161.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 163.
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. and enl. ed.
(New York: Penguin, [1963] 1992), pp. 244–245. See Seyla Benhabib, “International Law
and Human Plurality in the Shadow of Totalitarianism: Hannah Arendt and Raphael
Lemkin,” in idem, ed., Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times
(Cambridge: Polity, 2011), pp. 41–57.
Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 277.
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been given to man.”37 For Arendt, nothing less than a full-ﬂedged ontological defense of human plurality could justify the signiﬁcance of crimes
against humanity and its pinnacle, genocide.
Shklar says nothing about the legal or moral justiﬁcation of “crimes
against humanity.” Undoubtedly, she would dismiss Arendt’s ontological anchoring of this concept in the human condition of plurality as
a variant of natural law thinking. Can we rest satisﬁed, though, with
the simple positing of a new criminal statute to deal with new and
unprecedented acts? As is well-known, the German defense lawyers,
both in Nuremberg and during the Eichmann Trial, kept raising the
objection of nulla crimen, nulla poene sine lege (“no crime, no punishment without the law”), although none went so far as to claim that the
mass slaughter of innocent civilians, women and children was
a justiﬁable act of war. Rather, they maintained that the overall criminality of the regime left no choice but to consider the will of the
Führer as the law of the land. In that sense, legality, in the Third
Reich, meant criminality.
This form of perverted legalistic consciousness, exercised by the likes of
Eichmann, clearly was what Shklar herself also had in mind by legalism,
that is, blind obedience to orders and the law of the land, no matter how
perverse and criminal. Yet by leaving the concept of “crimes against
humanity” so unelaborated and philosophically unjustiﬁed, she left her
own argument open to the charge of Siegerjustiz. “As for the Eichmann
case it, too, does not really create new problems for legal theory,” she
writes. “Eichmann, alas, was always a Jewish problem.”38 From a nonlegal
point of view, the trial had to be judged in terms of its political value for the
various Jewish communities involved, but from a theoretical point of view,
the problems being the same in Nuremberg and in the Eichmann Trial, there
was no need to consider them separately.39 We have reasons to doubt this
conclusion because without the evidence concerning the Nazi genocide of
the Jews, which was not all that central to the Nuremberg Trials, the
category of crimes against humanity, hangs in mid-air. In this sense, the
Eichmann Trial contributed far more to the project of international criminal law than Shklar may have been willing to admit.

37

38

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1958]
1973), p. 7.
39
Shklar, Legalism, p. 155.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 155.
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3 The Morality of Law and the Hart–Fuller Debate
The morality and legality of the Hitler regime preoccupied not only
Shklar herself. In his famous exchange with Lon Fuller, H. L. A. Hart
discusses the case of a woman who in 1944, wishing to be rid of her
husband, had denounced him to the authorities for insulting remarks he
had made about Hitler.40 The husband was arrested and sentenced to
death, though he was not executed but sent to the front instead. In 1949,
the woman was prosecuted in a West German court for “illegally depriving a person of his freedom.” She pleaded that under Nazi laws, she had
committed no crime. The court of appeal held that the wife was guilty
because the Nazi statute was “contrary to the sound conscience and
sense of justice of all decent human beings.”41 Hart observed wryly
that: “The unqualiﬁed satisfaction with this result seems to me to be
hysteria.”42 The 1958 Hart–Fuller debate is the hinge between Shklar’s
chapters on “Law and Morals” and on “Law and Politics.”43 Shklar
considers this debate pivotal because if the rule of law is mistakenly
understood merely as the equal application of rules to like cases, no
matter how foundational or structural these might be, it would fail to
register the persistent pluralism of normative values, the historical
development of political institutions, and the deployment of public
power. Yet for her the exchange is disappointingly illustrative of the
regrettably “tiresome” state of debates between natural lawyers and
legal positivists, and was “essentially a family quarrel among
legalists.”44 Both sides afﬁrmed the “necessity of following rules” but
differed about what “ﬁdelity to law” means.45
Shklar considers Hart’s straightforwardly positivist position to be that
the rule of law requires the judge to apply valid rules, as undesirable or
unjust as they might be. To suspend or overturn an existing rule on account
of its injustice would, for Hart, upend the very framework of legality. As

40

41

42
43
45

H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law Review, 71
(1958), 593–629; Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and the Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor
Hart,” Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958), 630–672.
The phrases in quotation marks are from Hart’s recounting of the case: Hart, “Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals,” 619.
Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” 619.
Shklar, Legalism, pp. 107–111. 44 Shklar, Legalism, p. 106.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 106.
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Shklar sees it, positivism assigns to law a value distinct from its morality:
a security of “expectations based on existing rules” for which, by deﬁnition, adherence to legalist morality as rule-following is essential.46
Countering Hart, Fuller famously argued that upholding legality
required preserving the foundational “inner morality of the law,” even if
this involved retroactive punishment or other deviations from the ordinary
course of positivistic rule-following in the proximate sense. At stake,
Shklar writes, was the issue “whether law can be deﬁned so as to exclude
justice or not, or at least whether its partial inclusion commits one also to
a notion of a morality inherent in law.”47 She ﬁnds “odd” Fuller’s insistence
of an “inner morality” constitutive of legality and immanent to law as such.
Fuller, in her view, attempted unconvincingly to incorporate antipositivist
insights into positivistic legality without recourse to the extralegal sources
of natural law. The result, in any case, remained the same as Hart’s:
a pursuit of “legalistic morals,” of “equal application of rules . . . – preestablished, known, and accepted,” in keeping with “the lawyerly habit of
treating law as ‘there.’”48
Fuller aimed to defend his principles as more than instrumental to
effective legislation; they meant to express a basic “reciprocity between
government and citizen with respect to the observance of rules.”49
Notwithstanding Fuller’s insistence of their capacity to protect human
dignity,50 these principles were still strictly formal, and Fuller emphatically maintained that legality was connected to justice through form
alone. In this respect, on Shklar’s reading, Fuller replicates the abstract
legalism of Kant’s moral theory as critiqued by Hegel, and she chides
Fuller for divorcing the judge from “normative and political context
within which his ratiocinations take place.”51 Hart’s retort – that
Fuller’s emphasis on law’s formal consistency and rule-following were
nevertheless “compatible with very great iniquity”52 – seems to her to be
obvious and inescapable.53

46
48
49

50
51
52
53

47
Shklar, Legalism, p. 107.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 108 fn. 14.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 109.
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969),
p. 39.
Fuller, The Morality of Law, p. 162.
Shklar, “Political Theory and the Rule of Law,” p. 33.
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), pp. 206–207.
Shklar, Legalism, p. 109.
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4 Political Theory and the Rule of Law
Two decades later Shklar returns to the distinction between legalism and
the rule of law. Again she resists situating herself on the spectrum common
to contemporary debates on the proper theoretical formulation of the “rule
of law,” conceived from formal to substantive, each with “thinner” or
“thicker” alternatives. If formal conceptions attend to the “proper sources
and form of legality,” substantive theories additionally speak to “requirements about the content of the law.”54 Formal conceptions emphasize the
proper promulgation or authorization of the law, and many, if not all,
elements identiﬁed by Lon Fuller: law’s clarity, generality or generalizability, publicity, the conformity of law to the principle of noncontradiction, its stability over time, and its prohibition against retroactivity and
impracticability.55 Together, these comprise a set of formal requirements
that distinguish the rule of law as a particular mode of social organization.
Indeed, “thicker” interpretations of this formal account of the rule of law
identify an intrinsic discipline, and what Fuller called an “inner morality”
that amounts to a “procedural natural law.”56
Substantive theories, by contrast, do say something about these matters.
Represented most prominently by the work of Ronald Dworkin, these
theories deny that substantive justice is independent of legality, for they
consider the formalistic demarcation of procedure from substance to be
incoherent. They require, “as part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the
book capture and enforce moral rights,” as formulated in the ﬁnal analysis
by the judge on the basis of the principles of democracy, equality, liberty,
individual rights, or other criteria of morality and justice.57 Such substantive criteria underlie the concept of the rule of law itself, and they can
thereby be used to distinguish “good” law from “bad.”
Surveying the ongoing debate over precise delineations among formal,
procedural, substantive, and natural law conceptions among Fuller, Raz,
Dworkin and others through the mid-1980s, Shklar might have parsed
these classiﬁcations and their frayed edges, pressing questions they leave
open or only tenuously answer. But she chooses not to evaluate the
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alternatives as the debate had presented them; rather, she indicted the terms
of the debate itself. Shklar argues that the concept of “the rule of law” had
lost its political vitality. It had become abstract, shorn of contact with its
political, social, and historical context, because contemporary legal theories
“have lost a sense of what the political objectives of the ideal of the Rule of
Law originally were and have come up with no plausible restatement.”58 The
conceptualizations of the rule of law between formalist and substantive
approaches is itself a distortion, a product of the problem she diagnosed as
“legalism” almost twenty years prior, the misguided attempt to insulate law
from the context and purposes of morality and politics.
Just as she did in Legalism, Shklar enters the rule of law debate in order to
reframe it, to unsettle its underlying presumptions and aspirations. Her
guiding question is: what makes the ideal of the rule of law even
worth pursuing? This is not equivalent to the question whether the rule of
law is a politically or morally neutral concept, whether it is best expressed in
formal or substantive terms. Shklar seeks an anterior, genealogical corrective and a reminder: she inquires into the conditions that render any conceptualization of the rule of law intelligible – indeed, politically relevant.
To answer this question, Shklar recalls “two quite distinct archetypes,”
two ideal types of the rule of law drawn from the history of political
thought: Aristotle and Montesquieu. Aristotle’s rule of law is the rule of
reason in politics, a comprehensive ideal with “an enormous ethical and
intellectual scope.”59 Its “single most important condition” was the impartial judgment of the wise, “the constant disposition to act fairly and lawfully” and to “reason syllogistically.”60 The health of the polis depends on
the mediation of these powers of reasoning of the “judging agent,” though
they are admittedly conﬁned to a limited subset of the population and, of
course, are “perfectly compatible” with the slave society of ancient Athens
and modern fascist or apartheid states alike.61 Montesquieu, on the other
hand, conceives the rule of law more narrowly as “those institutional
restraints that prevent governmental agents from oppressing the rest of
society.”62 Law here does not defend the good life but rather relieves the
individual from the arbitrariness of those who rule. “[I]t fulﬁlls only one
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fundamental aim: freedom from fear.”63 And, while in this sense it is more
limited in its ambitions, Montesquieu’s vision is also broader than
Aristotle’s, for it applies to (the beneﬁt of) all. While contemporary
accounts of the rule of law draw on these archetypes, they are in fact
deformations, for they have forgotten “the political and historical contexts
that gave the original archetypes their meaning.”64

Conclusion
The history of legal thought is a series of moves toward formalization and
philosophical abstraction that have obscured those original vices and
virtues animating concern for the rule of law. What Shklar charts is
a story of forgetting.
In the vein of Montesquieu, she indicts the work of Dicey, Hayek, and
Unger. Dicey trivializes the original fear of arbitrary power instead as
a parochial preoccupation with formal access to established English courts
and to the assurance that all cases would be judged only by that same body of
judges. In Dicey’s formulations, Shklar writes, “[n]ot the structure or purposes
of juridical rigor but only its forms became signiﬁcant for freedom.”65
Likewise, she is dismayed by Hayek’s substitution of fear of arbitrary oppression and persecution with a concern instead for the uncertain arbitrariness
caused by human ignorance. Hayek’s rule of law aims at general and prospective principles that would “facilitate the free market,” allow individuals
to internalize basic rules of social conduct to minimize conﬂict and inefﬁciency, and to do so without recourse to the kind of social planning that ends
in totalitarianism. Shklar balks not only at the bare purposelessness of
Hayek’s rules for “spontaneous order” (“[t]hey adjust, they do not order”),
but also at the ahistorical quality of those “unfalsiﬁable assumptions about
human ignorance” on which Hayek’s approach relies.66 And equally, though
in a mirror image, Shklar chides Roberto Unger, in his too quick debunking of
liberal law’s masked hierarchies and exploitations, for offering a facile reading of Max Weber in place of serious historical inquiry.67 She ties Unger’s
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neglect of historical argument also to his dangerous utopianism, which
“shows little grasp of the fragilities of personal freedom which is the true
and only province of the Rule of Law.”68
Shklar next focuses on how the writings of Fuller and Dworkin exhibit
analogous abstractions that trivialize and deform the “rationality of judging” by stripping it of the “ethical and political setting[s]” in which it
might be realized.69 She notes in particular that their accounts dramatically
divorce the ﬁgure of the judge from the “normative and political context
within which his ratiocinations take place.” Unlike Aristotle, Fuller in his
conception of law’s “inner morality” “did not specify what sort of society
would be ruled by such a legal system, nor did he offer a very clear picture
of its other historical institutions for social control and coercion.”70
Likewise, Shklar notes that while Dworkin more adequately than Fuller
situates his judge Hercules within the course of American political culture,
he mistakenly claims for a circumscribed judiciary alone the privileged
work of “reasoned decision making.”71 If syllogistic judicial reasoning
from high principles might perhaps be a model for the rule of law, Shklar
doubts that Dworkin succeeds in showing how Hercules can perform this
role “considering the kinds of controversies and political structures in
which [Dworkin’s] program must inevitably embroil the judiciary.”72
We can draw number of conclusions from this remarkable set of observations. A ﬁrst aspect to note is that the liberal and Aristotelian archetypes
as Shklar sketches them do not translate straightforwardly into considerations of, respectively, formal and substantive theorists. The inclusion of the
formalist Fuller along with the substantive Dworkin within the Aristotelian
model is the case in point. This indicates again that Shklar resists the
received wisdom to systematize rule of law conceptions along the formal/substantive distinction and searches instead for a distinct line of
critique, one tracking degrees of contextualism and attention to politics,
institutions, sociology, and history. If the history of legal thinking about
the rule of law, including recent attempts to systematize this history,73 has
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obscured these dimensions, Shklar aims to recollect and revive them,
whether in the form of Montesquieu’s psychological justiﬁcation for limited government and appropriate checks on power, for example, or
Aristotle’s account of the relation of rational judgment to processes of
persuasion and coercive social control. Shklar concludes that the purpose
and value of the rule of law cannot be understood apart from the institutions, social structures, and historical junctures within which law is
embedded and its authority is to be practically realized.
Secondly, she maintains a creative ambivalence with respect to the uses
and abuses to which the rule of law – just like legalism itself – can be put. If
her reminder of law’s embededness resists the vices of an abstracted
legalism, her rebuke of Unger is a reminder of the opposite – of legality’s
virtues one ought not overlook too hastily. Indeed, this position places
signiﬁcant daylight between Shklar’s critique of legalism and the much
more reductive critique leveled by some in Critical Legal Studies of legal
formalism and liberalism as mere hypocrisy.74 Shklar’s critique illuminates
how the move towards philosophical abstraction yields a narrow discourse
that is blind not only to the vices of legalism as mere rule-following but
also to the possibly virtuous political ends that the creative deployment of
law and legal institutions might achieve in redressing political fear, violence, and injustice – as Shklar indeed argued was the case at Nuremberg.
Thirdly, Shklar’s critiques of Dworkin and Hayek taken together underscore her attention to the pluralism of politics and to the need for democratic political action and they help connect her work not only to Hannah
Arendt’s reﬂections on human plurality but also to Jürgen Habermas’s
critique of Dworkin’s Hercules as a lonely, monologic thinker. While
Shklar admittedly could not afﬁrm Arendt’s full-ﬂedged ontological
defense of human plurality, she grounds her critique of natural law in the
existence and desirability of diverse ethical views and thus a need for
toleration and more inclusive forms of civic belonging. And, indeed, her
reproach of Dworkin for his mistaken isolation of the high court judges as
the privileged source of authoritative political principles suggests her
rejection of the high liberal tendency to entrench law and legal judgment
within a comprehensive theory of justice.
The afﬁrmation of political diversity, coupled with a defense of purposeful public action in her critique of Hayek, also point, in Shklar’s
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understanding of law, to a nascent internal relationship between legality
and democratic forms of opinion- and will-formation. Although she was
never able to fully resolve the relationship between law and public reason
as part of her critique of legalism, in crucial respects Shklar here anticipates, while not resolving, Habermas’s positing of the internal relationship
between facticity and validity. Responding to Dworkin’s Hercules,
Habermas denied that the question of normative principles could be
anchored in the “ideal personality of a judge who distinguishes himself
by his virtue and his privileged access to the truth.”75 Instead, Habermas
sought to anchor such principles in the opinions and actions of a broader,
politically constituted citizenry, where the subjectivity of the judge could
be complemented by the intersubjectivity of a community of constitutional
interpreters as part of his discourse theory of law.
Such a move seems in crucial respects deeply responsive to her concerns.
Though much of this remains speculative, we might return to Shklar’s
thought to see embryonic strands of a legal theory that intertwines the
facticity and validity of the law more convincingly. Indeed, while it is true
that Shklar’s critique leaves unresolved the many paradoxes of legalism as
ideology, creative policy, and ethos, discourse theory might perhaps shed
light on plausible linkages between the medium of law and those deliberative democratic processes of a kind more receptive to political context,
institutions, and history, just as Shklar had hoped. And, conversely, if
the dimensions of facticity and validity do remain unresolved in Shklar’s
theory, perhaps we would do well to appreciate that they remain so
because of the richness of the way she conceived the different categories –
ideology, creative policy, ethos – within which they concurrently
function. Understanding her terms, then, is crucial in judging the adequacy, in turn, of the attempts of many contemporary theories to reconcile
these dimensions.
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